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ABSTRACT 
Learning by Doing and Multiproduction Effects over the Life Cycle:  Evidence 
from the Semiconductor Industry  
by Ralph Siebert 
In this study we derive a structural econometric model of learning by doing with 
multiproduct competition from a dynamic oligopoly game.  We show the importance to 
account for multiproduction effects through product differentiation when measuring 
learning by doing.  Using quarterly firm-level data for the dynamic random access 
memory semiconductor industry, we provide evidence that accounting for 
multiproduction results in lower learning effects and firms behaving more competitive 
in the product market.  We can confirm that firms follow intertemporal production plans 
for investing in future cost reductions. We also find that learning effects are higher at 
the beginning of the life cycle. 
 
Keywords: Dynamic Random Access Memory, Dynamics, Economies of Scale, Learning by 
Doing, Multiproduct Firms, Product Life Cycle, Product Market Competition, 
Semiconductors, Spillovers. 
JEL Classification: L1, L6, O3. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Lerneffekte unter Beruecksichtigung von Multiproduktionseffekten innerhalb des 
Produktlebenszyklus: Ergebnisse aus der Halbleiterindustrie 
Diese Studie untersucht das Ausmass von Lerneffekten unter Beruecksichtigung von 
Multiproduktionswettbewerb, basierend auf einem dynamischen Oligopol. Der 
empirische Teil der Untersuchung quantifiziert insbesondere den Einfluss der 
Produktdifferenzierung auf die Messung von Lerneffekten und Marktmacht. 
 
Auf der Grundlage von Quartalszahlen auf Unternehmensebene aus der dynamischen 
Speicherchipindustrie, erhalten wir das Ergebnis, dass die Berueksichtigung von 
Multiproduktwettbewerb in geringere Lerneffekte und einen kompetitiveren 
Produktmarkt resultiert. Weiterhin zeigen wir, dass Unternehmen dynamische 
Produktionsplaene beruecksichtigen, um zukuenftige Kostenreduzierungen zu erzielen. 
Schliesslich koennen wir bestaetigen, dass die erzielten Lerneffekte zu Anfang des 
Produktlebenszyklus am hoechsten sind. 
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Abstract
In this study we derive a stuctural econometric model of learning by doing
with multiproduct competition from a dynamic oligopoly game. We show the
importance to account for multiproduction eﬀects through product diﬀeren-
tiation when measuring learning by doing. Using quarterly firm-level data
for the dynamic random access memory semiconductor industry, we provide
evidence that accounting for multiproduction results in lower learning eﬀects
and firms behaving more competitive in the product market. We can confirm
that firms follow intertemporal production plans for investing in future cost
reductions. We also find that learning eﬀects are higher at the beginning of
the life cycle.
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1 Introduction
Many studies were investigating the phenomenon of learning by doing. Against the
background of learning by doing, workers and managers learn from their experiences
or improved processes, such that operations become more eﬃcient through reduced
time, labor costs, or material waste (see e.g. Dick, 1991; Fudenberg and Tirole,
1983; Majd and Pindyck, 1989; Spence, 1981; and Wright, 1936). Learning is
an important market determinant which frequently is considered for government
interventions, such as the design of subsidy programs, the promotion of entry and
industry growth, as well as antitrust investigations, e.g. the evaluation of setting
dumping prices.
The diﬃculty in measuring learning eﬀects is given by the fact that cost data
are often not observable. Most studies attribute firms’ production incentives to
the measurement of learning eﬀects. This procedure requires to control for firms’
production externalities in order to accurately capture the learning eﬀects.
Previous studies, often associated with single product firms, investigate learning
eﬀects taking external spillovers between firms into consideration (see e.g. Gruber,
1992; and Flamm, 1993). External spillovers impose positive externalities on rivals’
costs, implying that firms may produce less than socially optimal (see Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1983).
More recent studies on learning also account for internal spillovers, occurring
between diﬀerent products within one firm. Prominent examples are Irwin and
Klenow (1994), Benkard (2000), and Thornton and Thompson (2001). Internal
spillovers are due to multiproduction eﬀects on the cost side, e.g. through economies
of scope, and exert positive externalities to the firm. This may induce an increase
in production in order to achieve further cost savings for other products. The
omission of such externalities may result in diﬀerent production incentives which
will be attributed to the measurement of learning eﬀects, resulting in under- or
overestimated learning rates.
This study stresses the importance to account for another externality, which is
caused by multiproduction eﬀects through product diﬀerentiation. Those multipro-
duction eﬀects, having been neglected up to date, have relevant implications for the
measurement of learning eﬀects and market conduct.
Multiproduction eﬀects through product diﬀerentiation occur when interrela-
tions between the products exist (see also Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992).
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It is important to account for those interdependencies on the demand and supply
side, as it specifies the behavioral response of consumers and firms in a given mar-
ket. Multiproduct firms take their output decisions at a centralized level such that
they control competition eﬀects within their own product line and account for the
cross-price elasticities on its other products (see e.g. Bresnahan, 1987; Berry, 1994;
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; and Goldberg, 1995). Internalizing those multi-
production externalities has an impact on firms’ output decisions. When products
are substitutes, firms are aware of the negative externalities which will be imposed
on its other products, causing prices to decline. This may induce firms to lower their
output.
When accounting for learning by doing and multiproduction eﬀects through prod-
uct diﬀerentiation together, firms output decisions are characterized by the following
two opposing eﬀects: (i) a higher output achieves higher cost reductions in the fu-
ture through learning, which induces firms to increase their output, and (ii) a higher
output causes negative externalities on its other products (in case they are substi-
tutes), which then induces firms to lower their output. As the second eﬀect has
been neglected, a smaller production incentive was attributed to the measurement
of learning, resulting in an underestimated learning eﬀect.
Moreover, cross-price elasticities may further impact the measurement of learn-
ing in an intertemporal dimension. As firms follow a dynamic production strategy,
current output will determine future costs and prices through learning. Moreover,
as current output also determines future production, future prices of adjacent gen-
erations will be aﬀected through the inclusion of cross-price elasticities.
Finally, firms’ mark-ups, are determined by market conduct.1 The higher the
competitive degree in the market (lower conduct), the lower the mark-up. Nested
marginal costs will be estimated higher, which coincides with lower learning eﬀects.
Or in other words, the internalization of externalities on other products caused by
cross-price elasticities may capture a (previously omitted) quantity reduction, that
results in a higher output response by other firms indicating a higher competitive
degree in the product market. The consequence is a lower conduct, which coincides
with a lower mark-up. Marginal costs will be estimated higher, resulting in lower
estimated learning eﬀects.
The net eﬀect of multiproduct competition through product diﬀerentiation on
1The measurement of market conduct has often been analyzed in empirical studies (see e.g.
Genesove and Mullin, 1999).
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learning, is determined by the interrelation of these aspects: the change in firms’
production incentives due to cross-price elasticities and the change in market con-
duct. A higher estimated competitive degree in the product market may even over-
compensate for the larger price-cost margin induced by the inclusion of cross-price
elasticities.
A second aspect we concentrate on in this study, is the alteration of learning
eﬀects over the product life cycle. Many studies (e.g. Dick, 1991) already claimed
that learning by doing (LBD) eﬀects vary over the life cycle, such that LBD eﬀects
are higher at the beginning. The gap between dynamic and static marginal costs
narrows as the learning eﬀects become smaller at the end of the life cycle (see Figure
1).2 Hence, firms increase output most during the early stages of the life cycle and
may even obtain negative mark-ups by pricing according to their dynamic marginal
costs. The fact that LBD eﬀects are higher at the early stages of the life cycle
has never been empirically analyzed. Previous empirical specifications modelled
the LBD eﬀects as being constant over time. In order to precisely attribute firms’
output incentives to learning eﬀects we need to control for the alteration of the
learning eﬀects over the life cycle.
We specify a dynamic oligopolistic state-space game using past production ex-
perience as the state variable. We derive the supply functions for a multiproduct
firm specification with diﬀerentiated products and estimate a structural dynamic
model of demand and pricing equations. The focus of this study lies on the esti-
mation of market determinants such as learning eﬀects as well as market conduct.
Using quarterly firm-level data for the dynamic random access memory (DRAM)
semiconductor industry, we estimate the market determinants for a model with mul-
tiproduction eﬀects through product diﬀerentiation and compare the estimates with
a model neglecting those multiproduction eﬀects, a single product firm specification.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
structural characteristics of the semiconductor industry and, in particular, of the
DRAM industry. In Section 3, we present the theoretical model of learning by doing
with multiproduct firms. Section 4 describes the empirical model. We then turn to
a description of the data in Section 5 and present the results. We summarize and
conclude this study in Section 6.
2This figure is taken from Dick (1991).
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2 The Semiconductor Industry
In the 1980s an extensive policy debate in the United States focused on the semi-
conductor industry.3 The discussions centered on the increased competition brought
on by the larger number of foreign firms in the United States market, targeting in
particular the below-cost sales of Japanese firms. In March 1986, the United States
Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission concluded that
Japanese firms set dumping prices for the 64K DRAM chips and other varieties of
their semiconductors in the United States.4
A considerable number of economic research and policy suggestions have been
made with regard to this investigation. Numerous authors have shown that learning
has an enormous impact on costs and output decisions.5 For example, Dick (1991)
rejected the dumping hypothesis for the semiconductor industry on the basis that
firms follow an intertemporal production strategy, as they will learn in the future
from current output. Firms make their optimal output decisions not on the basis
of static marginal costs (MCs) but rather on their dynamic marginal costs (MCD)
which lie below (see Figure 1). Especially at the beginning of the life cycle when
learning rates are supposed to be high, prices may fall below static marginal costs.
Many empirical studies find, once LBD eﬀects are taken into consideration, only
little evidence that Japanese semiconductor firms engaged in dumping, see e.g.
Flamm (1993), Irwin and Klenow (1994). This finding confirms the relevance of
accounting for learning eﬀects and their implications for policy decisions.
Semiconductors are mainly used as inputs for the computer industry (45% of
its sales), consumer electronics (23%), and communications equipment (13%). The
semiconductor market consists of memory chips, micro components, and logic de-
vices. Memory chips (designed for the storage of information in binary form) rep-
resent the highest market share (30%). Memory chips consist of DRAM, SRAM,
ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, and flash memories. DRAM and SRAM are volatile
3Jorgenson (2001) points out that the semiconductor market is an important industry, as the
enormous price decline has been transmitted to product prices that rely heavily on the semicon-
ductor market, i.e. the aircraft, automobiles, and scientific instruments industry.
4The United States antidumping laws are included in the United States Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §1673.
5For theoretical work in this area see, for example, Wright (1936), Spence (1981), Fudenberg and
Tirole (1983), Lieberman (1982 and 1984), and Dick (1991). For empirical work in this industry,
see Irwin and Klenow (1994), Flamm (1996), Gruber (1996), and Nye (1996).
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memory chips, for they lose memory once the power is switched oﬀ. They account
for about 90% of the memory chip market. All of the others are non-volatile chips,
which do not lose memory (see Gruber, 1996). The DRAM market is characterized
by worldwide selling companies from the United States, Japan, Europe, and other
countries in the Asian-Pacific region, with a 20.3%, 44.5%, 3.1%, and 32.0% market
share, respectively (Dataquest, 1995).
DRAMs are classified into generations according to their storage capacity, which
increases by a factor of four. Every generation is a homogenous good in itself, but
diﬀerent generations represent diﬀerentiated goods (see Gruber, 1996). The life cy-
cles last for about five years and look very similar to each other. Once a generation
is launched, shipments increase enormously and begin to fall when a new generation
is introduced. At the industry level, diﬀerent generations overlap each other (see
Figure 2). The same pattern occurs at the firm level, where firms simultaneously
produce adjacent generations. For instance, both chips having been under investi-
gation in the United States, the 64K and the 256K chip, are sold by firms that oﬀer
at least one further adjacent chip. Focusing on the 64K chip producers, 15 out of
22 produce the 16K DRAM chip, and 19 firms produce the 256K DRAM chip; 12
firms produce even both adjacent generations. Table 1 illustrates the multiproduct
firm character for the industry and provides evidence for an oligopolistic industry
structure.
The prices for every generation are rapidly decreasing over the life cycles, see
Figure 3. The price is high at the beginning and monotonically falls until it bottoms
out at the end of the life cycle. The enormous price decline, especially at early stages
of the life cycle, is consistent with the notion that learning eﬀects are higher at the
beginning.
DRAM chips are produced by etching circuitry design onto wafers of silicon.
The manufacturing process is carried out very precisely in terms of temperature,
dust, vibration levels, and other determinants. During the production process, firms
decrease costs for a given technology by increasing the yield rate and reducing the
required amount of silicon material. The yield rate is measured by the ratio of
chips that pass the quality test with respect to the above mentioned criteria, and
is improved through learning. At the beginning of the life cylce the yield rate often
starts at 10% and increases to 90 % at the end of the life cycle (see also Dick, 1991).6
6Another aspect of learning by doing is the ‘organizational forgetting’ hypothesis. With regard
to the airline industry, Benkard (2000) found evidence to show that a firm’s production experience
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Irwin and Klenow (1994) and Flamm (1996) provide evidence that learning is
rather limited towards one generation instead of spilling over between diﬀerent gener-
ations. Gruber (1992) noted that learning enters the manufacturing process through
the fine-tuning of generation-specific production processes.7 Based on these findings,
we abstract from multiproduction eﬀects in costs and concentrate on multiproduc-
tion eﬀects through product diﬀerentiation.
3 The Model
For the theoretical model, we make our assumptions based on the previous industry
description. We shall consider a game similar to that introduced by Jarmin (1994)
which is based on Fudenberg and Tirole (1983).8 A feedback, oligopolistic dynamic
game (state-space game) is modelled with nmultiproduct firms, indexed by i = 1...n,
oﬀering subsequent generations k = 1...K, in t = 1...T discrete time periods. With
state-space games, all past pay-oﬀ relevant choices that aﬀect current profits are
aggregated into a state-variable for each firm. The current state vector at time period
t is described by each firms’ cumulative production for generation k, Xk,t = (xi,k,t)
n
i=1
where xi,k,t =
t−1P
v=1
qi,k,v denotes firm i’s production experience for generation k, until
period t−1. We consider feedback strategies in which the information set consists of
calendar time and the current state vector. In the feedback structure firms decide on
their future strategies at any point in time conditional on their past. In each period
of this game, the firms take the current state (past production) and the mechanism
for determining future behavior as given. Each firm uses its state-dependent rules
to choose current output in each period, with the objective of maximizing the payoﬀ
function over the entire product life cycle.9 Firms take intertemporal eﬀects on
depreciates over time. Forgetting is crucial in labor intensive industries, but not as important in
capital-intensive industries, like the semiconductor industry.
7In labor-intensive industries, such as the aircraft and shipbuilding industries, learning is rather
characterized by improving workers’ and managers’ operations.
8Related studies are Karp and Perloﬀ (1989) who developed a dynamic feedback oligopoly model
that can be used to estimate the degree of market power. Slade (1995) developed a dynamic model
in which firms strategies are described by two state variables, prices and advertising intensity. The
model is applied for the saltine cracker market. As we focus on multiproduct firms with past
production as the state variable, we build on the model by Fudenberg and Tirole and Jarmin.
9Feedback strategies are also called closed loop strategies. For a comparison between closed
loop and open loop strategies, in which firms precommit towards their production at the beginning
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their own and rivals’ unit costs in the future through learning into account. A Nash
equilibrium in feedback strategies is subgame perfect, when each firm’s strategies are
optimal at any time t and state, given the other firm’s choices. Each firm correctly
anticipates how the future actions of its rivals depend on its future costs and on its
current output, which prevents firms from making threats they wish not want to
carry out.10
As we focus on multiproduction eﬀects through product diﬀerentiation, we ab-
stract from intergenerational spillovers, which is consistent with the industry, see
Irwin and Klenow (1994).11 Moreover, in order to derive the interdependency be-
tween learning and market conduct, we focus on the firm’s maximization problem for
generation k. Firm i’s objective function for generation k, is maximized according
to
max
qi,k,t
Πi,k =
TP
t=1
δt−1 {P (qk−1,t, qk,t, qk+1,t) qi,k,t − C (qi,k,t,Wi,k,t, Xk,t)}
subject to
Xk,t = Xk,t−1 +Qk,t−1, and Xk,0 = 0,
where δ is the discount rate and P (qk−1,t, qk,t, qk+1,t) represents the inverse demand
function. As can be seen, the multiproduct eﬀect enters on the demand side, be-
cause the market price Pk,t not only depends on the total quantity qk,t =
nP
i=1
qi,k,t
of generation k, but also on the total quantities qk−1,t =
nP
i=1
qi,k−1,t, and qk+1,t =
nP
i=1
qi,k+1,t of the adjacent generations.
12 The industry output vector is denoted by
Qk,t−1 = (qi,k,t−1)
n
i=1. Firm i’s costs for generation k in period t, given by Ci,k,t :=
C (qi,k,t,Wi,k,t,Xk,t) , depends on the contemporaneous firm-level output qi,k,t, firm-
level factor prices Wi,k,t, the cumulative past output vector, Xk,t of its own and of
all other firms’ experience for generation k until period t − 1. Hence, firm i learns
from its own experience xi,k,t and also benefits through spillovers from its rivals’
of the life cycle, see Zulehner (2002).
10Feedback equilibria are unique, when the equations of motion are linear and the objective
functions are quadratic in the state and control variables (see Basar and Olsder, 1991).
11Therefore, we assume that the production of generation k is independent of past production
of previous generations.
12As only adjacent products are simultaneously oﬀered in the market, the cross-price eﬀects to
be estimated can be limited towards both adjacent generations.
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cumulative past output
nP
j 6=i
xj,k,t.
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We derive firms’ first order conditions which are empirically implemented later
on. The necessary condition with respect to the quantity of generation k, is given
by
Pk,t +
∂qk,t
∂qi,k,t
·
∂Pk−1,t
∂qk,t
qi,k−1,t +
∂Pk,t
∂qk,t
qi,k,t +
∂Pk+1,t
∂qk,t
qi,k+1,t
¸
=
∂Ci,k,t
∂qi,k,t
+
TX
s=t+1
δs−t
(
∂Ci,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
+ δ
nX
j 6=i
∂Ci,k,s+1
∂xj,k,s+1
∂qj,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
−
nX
j=1
∂qj,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
×
µ
∂Pk−1,s
∂qk,s
qi,k−1,s +
∂Pk,s
∂qk,s
qi,k,s +
∂Pk+1,s
∂qk,s
qi,k+1,s
¶)
(1)
for t < s. The first line shows firm i’s marginal profits in a static environment without
LBD. It gives the direct eﬀect of firm i’s output choice on its profits. The left hand
side represents firm i’s marginal revenues. The expression
∂qk,t
∂qi,k,t
indicates the con-
duct parameter (see also Iwata, 1974; and Bresnahan, 1989). A conduct parameter
equal to zero refers to perfect competition, where firms behave ‘competitively’ in the
market, whereas a parameter equal to one indicates that firms behave like Cournot
players, which coincides with ‘softer’ behavior.14 In comparing to the standard
marginal revenue term when only one homogenous good is considered in the market
(single product firm specification), further cross-price eﬀects
³
∂Pk−1,t
∂qk,t
and
∂Pk+1,t
∂qk,t
´
enter the pricing relation. When adjacent products are substitutes (complements),
13For notational convenience and in order to better to distinguish between own learning by doing
eﬀects and spillovers, we separate own experience xi,k,t, from others’ experience
P
j 6=i
xj,k,t.
14In estimating market conduct, Corts (1999) has shown that the identification of market con-
duct parameters leads to biased estimates when fluctuations in demand are relatively high. The
estimated conduct parameter is fully determined by ‘equilibrium variation’, the extent to which
equilibrium quantities respond to fluctuations in demand. Hence, the conduct parameter measures
the ‘slope’ of the price-cost margin with respect to demand variations. The conjectural variations
parameter, however, measures the level of the price-cost margin. Consistent estimates of the con-
duct parameter (in order to accurately measure market power) will provide consistent estimates
for the conjecural parameter when the ‘marginal’ relationship of price-cost margin to quantity
is identical to the ‘average’ relationship of the price-cost margin. As shipments in this industry
are rather characterized by smooth movements in demand - rather than high demand and supply
shocks when, for example, switching between diﬀerent competition regimes occurs- this problem is
rather minor in this industry.
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the cross-price eﬀects are supposed to be negative (positive). The right hand side
in the first line represents the common contemporaneous or static marginal costs
and indicates how current output aﬀects current costs through economies of scale
(ECS).
The following two lines show the dynamic link between firms’ current output
decisions and firms’ environment they find themselves in the future, induced by
learning. The term
∂Ci,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
refers to the LBD eﬀect, indicating that own current
output increases own experience and yields own cost savings in the future. If LBD
eﬀects are present, the term is expected to be negative.
The term
∂Ci,k,s+1
∂xj,k,s+1
∂qj,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
represents the spillover eﬀect, in which the expres-
sion
∂qj,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
indicates an intertemporal strategic term. The latter expression
shows that firm i’s output decision in period t increases its experience in the future,
having an impact on other firms’ future output decisions.15 The spillover eﬀect
measures by how much firm i’s costs decline through capturing part of the rivals’
experience. The third line of equation (1) shows that future own and cross-price ef-
fects enter firm i’s pricing relation interacting with the strategic intertemporal term.
Therefore, the inclusion of cross-price eﬀects also incorporates an intertemporal im-
pact on price-cost margins and the measurement of learning eﬀects.
As figured out in equation (1), marginal revenues in a multiproduct specification
with product diﬀerentiation are determined by a further component, the cross-price
eﬀects. In order to simplify the following analysis and to focus on the main issue, we
will consider the case when adjacent products are substitutes. The cross-price eﬀects
have implications for firms’ output decisions as they cause negative externalities on
adjacent generations. A multiproduct firm takes into account that a higher output
of generation k lowers the prices of its adjacent generations. In the presence of
learning, the output decisions of multiproduct firms are characterized by a trade-oﬀ
between increasing the output in order to achieve higher cost reductions through
learning eﬀects and lowering the output because prices of adjacent products are
negatively aﬀected. In empirical studies, however, observed output is referred to
15The sign of the intertemporal strategic term is ambiguous and depends on the relative mag-
nitude of the LBD and spillover eﬀects (see Jarmin, 1994). When LBD eﬀects are relatively high
compared to spillover eﬀects, current output of firm i (qi,k,t) and future output of firm j (qj,k,s)
are strategic substitutes, hence, the intertemporal strategic term will be negative. When spillovers
are relatively high, qi,k,t and qj,k,s can be seen as strategic complements and the intertemporal
strategic term will be negative.
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the measurement of learning eﬀects. Consequently, the inclusion of the cross-price
eﬀects, ceteris paribus, results in higher price-cost margins, see equation (1). In our
empirical analysis through which a nested marginal cost function will be estimated,
it follows that dynamic marginal costs will be estimated lower and learning will be
estimated higher, once multiproduction eﬀects are taken into account.
The diﬀerence between prices and dynamic marginal costs is also determined
by firms’ conduct in the market,
∂qk,t
∂qi,k,t
. The conduct parameter describes firms’
contemporaneous output reactions to firm i’s output increase and determines firms’
market power. As multiproduct firms are aware of the externalities on adjacent
products, a diﬀerent output incentive might be attributed to market conduct when
estimating a multiproduct firm specification with product diﬀerentiation. This may
result in a more ‘competitive’, ‘identical’, or ‘softer’ estimated market conduct, which
impacts the estimate of dynamic marginal costs. For example, a higher competitive
degree in the market results in a lower price-cost margin, which is equivalent to the
measurement of higher dynamic marginal costs and lower learning eﬀects.
The impact on the measurement of learning depends on the relative magnitude
between the cross-price eﬀects and the conduct parameter. In case the conduct pa-
rameter is estimated to be more competitive in a multiproduct specification,16 the
larger price-cost margin induced by negative cross-price eﬀects will be overcompen-
sated for by a more competitive market conduct, resulting in lower measurement of
learning eﬀects.17
We can therefore conclude that multiproduction eﬀects through product diﬀer-
entiation may have crucial implications for learning eﬀects. From the arguments
above, we derive the following hypothesis:
If market conduct is estimated to be more competitive in a multiproduct
firm than in a single product firm specification, learning eﬀects will be
estimated smaller.
In the next section, we test our hypothesis by estimating a structural dynamic
model consisting of demand and pricing relations, based on equation (1).
16We may expect that the omitted output reduction (resulting from externalities on neighboring
products) results in a more competitive market conduct for the multiproduct firm specification.
17When firms behave only slightly more ‘competitive’ (‘identically’ or more ‘softly’), the smaller
conduct parameter will be overcompensated for by the negative cross-price eﬀects. The price-
shadow cost margin enlarges in a multiproduct firm specification. Hence, marginal shadow costs
will be lower and learning eﬀects will be higher when multiproduct firms are under investigation.
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4 The Empirical Model
In order to test our hypothesis, the following structural model will be estimated,
having been derived from the theoretical model. The model consists of three inverse
demand functions (from which we derive the corresponding own and cross-price
eﬀects) and firms’ pricing relations, based on equation (1). The latter will be esti-
mated for a multiproduction specification with product diﬀerentiation and a single
product firm specification. The resulting estimates for learning and firms’ market
power will then be compared with respect to our hypothesis. We will also control
for the alteration of learning eﬀects over the life cycle.
4.1 The Inverse Demand Functions
The inverse demand functions are linear specifications (see also, e.g. Flamm, 1996)
given by18
Pk−1,t = a0 + a1 ∗ qk−2,t + a2 ∗ qk−1,t + a3 ∗ qk,t (2)
+a4 ∗ qk−1,t ∗WGDPELt + a5 ∗ t+ εk−1,t
Pk,t = b0 + b1 ∗ qk−1,t + b2 ∗ qk,t + b3 ∗ qk+1,t (3)
+b4 ∗ qk,t ∗WGDPELt + b5 ∗ t+ µk,t
Pk+1,t = c0 + c1 ∗ qk,t + c2 ∗ qk+1,t + c3 ∗ qk+2,t (4)
+c4 ∗ qk+1,t ∗WGDPELt + c5 ∗ t+ ωk+1,t.
For the sake of convenience, let us consider the inverse demand equation (3) only; the
same arguments apply to equations (2) and (4). As can be seen in equation (3), the
price Pk,t depends on the industry output of the generation under consideration (qk,t),
as well as the industry output of the adjacent generations qk−1,t and qk+1,t.
19 In order
18The specification of the inverse demand functions is in line with the study by Flamm (1996)
and Brist and Wilson (1997) in which neighboring generations are specified as possible substitutes.
Regarding the robustness of diﬀerent demand specifications, see Genesove and Mullin (1999). A
log-linear specification would cause problems when adjacent generations have 0 shipments.
19Note that one chip generation represents a homogenous good in itself, whereas adjacent gen-
erations are rather diﬀerentiated between each other (see Flamm, 1996; and Irwin and Klenow,
1994).
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to avoid identification problems, we account for rotating demand (see Lau, 1982)
and add an interaction term consisting of the industry output for the generation
under consideration multiplied byWGDPELt which refers to the worldwide GDP in
electronics and electronical products and is supposed to capture the overall activity
in electronics (see Flamm, 1996). The variable is constructed through the production
output of the five leading countries selling electronic products, such as the USA,
Japan, Germany, France, and the UK.20 The variable t represents a time trend
indicating the length of time a generation has been in the market and corrects for
intergenerational “transition” eﬀects (see Flamm, 1996).21 The expression b2 + b4 ∗
WGDPELt indicates the own-price eﬀect. The sign is expected to be negative, for
a higher output results in lower prices. The parameters b1 and b3 refer to the cross-
price eﬀects and are supposed to be negative (positive) when adjacent products are
substitutes (complements). From the estimation of the inverse demand equations
(2), (3), and (4) we obtain the corresponding price eﬀects, given by the estimated
parameters ba3, bb2 + bb4 ∗ WGDPELt, and bc1, which are plugged into the pricing
relation in the second stage.
Since output is endogenously chosen by firms, we need to use instruments, in
order to identify the demand elasticity. As the instruments are supposed to capture
the shifts on the supply side, we use marginal cost shifters, summary characteris-
tics of the supply side, that are exogenous to our demand, and exogenous demand
characteristics. Those instruments are: price of material (silicon),22 the number of
firms in the market, the Worldwide Purchasing Power Parity - constructed by tak-
ing an average of the Purchasing Power Parities of Japan, Germany, France, Italy,
and Korea -, the worldwide GDP in electronics, and the age of the generation.23
The inverse demand functions (2), (3), and (4) are estimated by using the GMM
estimator by Andrews (1991 and 1992) which corrects for serial correlation and het-
eroscedasticity. We assume additive econometric disturbance terms which have a
20These five countries account for more than 90% of the worldwide production in electronics
among the OECD countries, which guarantees a good measure for the worldwide GDP. Missing
data in the time series data of other countries prevents us from including more than those countries.
21The time trend could also be interpreted as a proxy for intertemporal price discrimination
among consumers.
22In order to explain shifts in the average industry price, we use an world market factor price
(silicon) as marginal cost shifter.
23The selection of these instruments is similar to Brist and Wilson (1997), which yields robust
results.
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mean of zero and fulfill the orthogonality condition.
4.2 The Pricing Relations
The pricing relations are derived from the first-order condition in the theoretical
model, see equation (1). As described above, price is a function of output and
dynamic marginal costs. Firms’ dynamic marginal costs are composed of the static
marginal costs and the dynamic eﬀects which yield future cost reductions through
learning. We begin with describing firms’ static marginal costs, approximated by
the following semi-log functional form,
∂Ci,k,t
∂qi,k,t
= α0,i + α1 lnLBDi,k,t + α2 (lnLBDi,k,t)
2 + α3 lnECSi,k,t + α4 (lnECSi,k,t)
2
+α5 lnSpilli,k,t + α6 (lnSpilli,k,t)
2 + α7 lnMATt + α8 lnUCCi,t
+ α9 lnLABi,k,t + α10 lnEi,k,t + α11 lnFPi,k,t + ηi,k,t (5)
where α0,i is a positive firm-specific eﬀect.
For the empirical specification of firms’ static marginal costs we take into account
that past accumulated output shifts marginal costs through learning. The variables
LBD and LBD2 capture firms’ own learning eﬀects; lnLBDi,k,t measures firm i’s
experience in production and is constructed by taking the logarithm of the accu-
mulated past production of firm i for generation k until period t− 1, (lnLBDi,k,t)2
is the squared expression and tests whether the learning curve has a diﬀerent slope
over the life cycle. The LBD elasticity
¡
α1 + 2α2lnLBDk
¢
Á∂Ck∂qk is expected to have
a negative sign since a higher degree of experience is supposed to reduce marginal
costs.24 The sign of the parameter α2 indicates whether the LBD curve is concave or
convex. A positive (negative) sign shows that the learning eﬀects are higher (lower)
at the beginning of the life cycle.
ECS eﬀects are measured by the variables ECS and ECS2. These are con-
structed by using the logarithm of firms’ current output of generation k in period t.
The overall ECS eﬀect is given by the expression
¡
α3 + 2α4lnECSk
¢
Á∂Ck∂qk . The sign
is expected to be negative, zero, or positive when increasing, constant, or decreasing
returns are prevalent.25 The squared expression ECS2 captures varying ECS eﬀects
over the product life cycle.
24A bar indicates firms’ average over time.
25Considering both, LBD and ECS eﬀects together, is necessary for both influence each other.
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The variables Spill and Spill2 measure the learning eﬀect that firms gain from
their rivals’ experience through spillovers; lnSpilli,k,t is constructed by taking the
logarithm of the accumulated past production of all other firms for generation k
until period t − 1 divided by the existing number of firms in the market.26 Spill2
tests if the learning curve, influenced by spillovers, has a diﬀerent slope over the life
cycle. The overall spillover eﬀect is given by
¡
α5 + 2α6lnSpillk
¢
Á∂Ck∂qk . The sign of
α6 is positive (negative) if firm i is able to benefit more from others’ experience at
the beginning (end) of the life cycle.
We use four diﬀerent input prices. The variable MATt measures the price of
material (silicon) and is taken from the ‘Metal Bulletin’. The other three input
prices are calculated on a firm-level basis. The variable UCCi,t is the firm-specific
user cost of capital, which is calculated on the basis of the business reports. For
the remaining two factor prices LABi,k,t and Ei,k,t (labor and energy costs), we take
into account the international generation-specific production locations for each firm
and correct for diﬀerent factor prices in diﬀerent countries (production locations).
We use the number of diﬀerent production plants for every firm and every period,
in every country. In addition, we use country-specific wages and energy prices. The
country-specific factor prices are then weighted with the proportion of plants that
each firm operates in every country. The labor costs for firm i, oﬀering generation
k in period t, are collected for the semiconductor industry (ISIC 3825) and taken
from the STAN Database, OECD (1998). The energy prices for firm i, oﬀering
generation k in period t, are taken from Energy prices and taxes, International
Energy Agency/OECD (1998). The parameter estimates of the input prices are
expected to have a positive sign since higher input prices increase marginal costs.
The variable FPi,k,t captures all other factor prices. Because the firms produce in
diﬀerent countries and the other factor prices vary considerably from country to
country, we construct the variable by multiplicatively combining the Producer Price
Index with the Purchase Power Parity of each of the countries where production
takes place, such as the USA, Japan, Germany, the UK, Korea, and Taiwan. These
The existence of ECS results in a contemporaneous unit cost decline by increasing output. Ig-
norance of ECS coincides with an inappropriate omission of the current output variable which
impacts the learning eﬀects. The cost reduction eﬀect is exclusively attributed to the learning
curve, though part of it is in fact due to the presence of ECS: an omitted variable bias will occur
(see Berndt, 1991).
26We use the average accumulated past production in the industry, in order to account for the
fact that the progress of a technology mainly occurs at the industry or inter-firm level.
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indexes are then weighted with the proportion of plants that every firm operates in
every country.
As mentioned above, learning also induces a dynamic aspect which yields future
cost reductions. For that reason we must account for the fact that firms may price
below their static marginal costs in order to achieve future cost reductions. More-
over, we must control for firms’ location within the life cycle, in order to capture
firms’ dynamic production plans over the life cycle.27 The model would be over-
parameterized if all terms that measure dynamic eﬀects would be estimated. We
enable the estimation procedure through capturing the dynamic eﬀects over the life
cycle (equation (1)) as follows, for the multiproduct firm specification (in which own
and cross-price eﬀects enter)
TP
s=t+1
δs−t
(
∂Ci,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
+ δ
nP
j 6=i
∂Ci,k,s+1
∂xj,k,s+1
∂qj,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
−
nP
j=1
∂qj,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
×
µ
∂Pk−1,s
∂qk,s
qi,k−1,s +
∂Pk,s
∂qk,s
qi,k,s +
∂Pk+1,s
∂qk,s
qi,k+1,s
¶¾
= α12Futi,k,t + α13 (Futi,k,t)
2 + φi,k,t (6)
and the equivalent for the single product firm specification (in which only own-price
eﬀects enter)
TP
s=t+1
δs−t
(
∂Ci,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
+ δ
nP
j 6=i
∂Ci,k,s+1
∂xj,k,s+1
∂qj,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
−
nP
j=1
∂qj,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂xi,k,s
∂qi,k,t
∂Pk,s
∂qk,s
qi,k,s
)
= eα12Futi,k,t + eα13 (Futi,k,t)2 + κi,k,t (7)
where Futi,k,t represents a firm-specific time trend, indicating how many periods in
the life cycle firm i already oﬀers generation k. We also control for varying dynamic
eﬀects over the life cycle by including the squared expression. The intertemporal
eﬀect is given by
¡
α12 + 2α13Futk
¢
which is expected to carry a negative sign. The
static marginal cost function (equation (5)) and the dynamic eﬀects for the diﬀerent
specification (equation (6) and (7)) will be inserted into the first order condition
(equation (1)) of the theoretical model. Solving for the price P gives the pricing
27One alternative might be to apply the method by Pakes and McGuire (1994), see also Ericson
and Pakes (1995). As the number of firms in the industry is around 20, this method is diﬃcult to
apply.
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relation, which we estimate for the multiproduct firm and the single product firm
specification.
Multiproduct Firm Specification
The pricing relation for the multiproduct firm specification is given in the following
form28
Pk,t = α0,i + α1 lnLBDi,k,t + α2 (lnLBDi,k,t)
2 + α3 lnECSi,k,t + α4 (lnECSi,k,t)
2
+α5 lnSpilli,k,t + α6 (lnSpilli,k,t)
2 + α7 lnMATt + α8 lnUCCi,t
+α9 lnLABi,k,t + α10 lnEi,k,t + α11 lnFPi,k,t + α12Futi,k,t + α13 (Futi,k,t)
2
−α14CONDMi,k,t + ωi,k,t. (8)
The parameter α0,i picks up several firm-specific eﬀects, namely α0,i = α0,i + bα0,i,
where α0,i is defined as in the marginal cost function and bα0,i is supposed to cap-
ture remaining unobserved heterogeneities. The variable CONDMi,k,t represents the
expression
h
∂Pk−1,t
∂qk,t
qi,k−1,t +
∂Pk,t
∂qk,t
qi,k,t +
∂Pk+1,t
∂qk,t
qi,k+1,t
i
(from equation (1)) where the
own-price eﬀect ∂Pk,t∂qk,t as well as the cross-price eﬀects
∂Pk−1,t
∂qk,t
and
∂Pk+1,t
∂qk,t
will be sub-
stituted with the estimated parameters bb2+ bb4∗WGDPELt, ba3, and bc1, respectively,
from the inverse demand equation. The parameter α14 measures the conduct pa-
rameter, given by
∂qk,t
∂qi,k,t
. Because firms’ output is endogenously chosen we need to
use instruments. As the instruments are supposed to capture shifts on the demand
side, we use the worldwide GDP in electronics, as well as exogenous variables in
our model, like number of firms, and firm-level factor prices.29 We assume additive
econometric disturbance terms, which are identically distributed with mean zero
and variance Φ. The pricing relation is estimated by using two-stage least squares.
28In order to guarantee that the cost function is well-behaved, we impose a linear homogeneity
of degree 1 in input prices, α11 = 1−
10P
i=7
αi.
29For a more detailed discussion on regaining consistency when accumulated output is correlated
with the error term, see e.g. Olley and Pakes (1996).
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Single Product Firm Specification
The single-product firm specification is in line with the multiproduct firm specifica-
tion, given by30
Pk,t = eα0,i + eα1 lnLBDi,k,t + eα2 (lnLBDi,k,t)2 + eα3 lnECSi,k,t + eα4 (lnECSi,k,t)2
+eα5 lnSpilli,k,t + eα6 (lnSpilli,k,t)2 + eα7 lnMATt + eα8 lnUCCi,t
+eα9 lnLABi,k,t + eα10 lnEi,k,t + eα11 lnFPi,k,t + eα12Futi,k,t + eα13 (Futi,k,t)2
−eα14CONDSi,k,t + ψi,k,t. (9)
The variable CONDSi,k,t represents the term
h
∂Pk,t
∂qk,t
qi,k,t
i
for the single product firm
specification, taken from equation (1). The parameter eα14 indicates the conduct
parameter given by
∂qk,t
∂qi,k,t
. Because the diﬀerence between the single product and
multiproduct firm specification is given in that cross-price eﬀects do not enter the
pricing relation in a single product specification, we only have to substitute the own-
price eﬀect ∂Pk,t∂qk,t with the estimated parameter
bb2+ bb4 ∗WGDPELt from the inverse
demand equation.31 For the estimation procedure as well as for the instruments the
same procedure as for the multiproduct firm specification applies.
5 Data and Results
The analysis requires data from a variety of diﬀerent sources. Some of them have
been described already above. The database consists of two diﬀerent parts. The first
part, provided by Dataquest, describes quarterly firm-level shipments and average
industry prices for the three diﬀerent generations beginning in 1974 for the 4K
generation and ending in 1996 for the 1MB generation. The second part consists of
market characteristics and factor prices which have been discussed above. Summary
30We impose the same restriction as for the multiproduct specification on the cost parameters,
which is eα11 = 1− 10P
i=7
eαi.
31Keep in mind that previous literature followed the same procedure when estimating the single
product firm specification. The demand equation has been estimated with respect to adjacent
generations, and only the own-price eﬀect was considered inthe pricing relation.
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statistics and definitions of the variables used in the estimation are shown in Table
2.
As the pricing relations will be estimated for the 64K DRAM generation (k), we
need to estimate the inverse demand equations for the 64K DRAM generation (k),
as well as for the 16K DRAM and 256K DRAM generations (k − 1 and k + 1,
respectively). The estimation results of the inverse demand equations (2), (3), and
(4) are presented in Table 3. In the estimation procedures 36, 68, and 57 observations
have been used for generations k−1, k, and k+1, respectively. All three estimations
have a remarkably good fit. The adjusted R-squares are 0.70 and higher, and all
price-eﬀects but one are significant at least at the 10% level. The own-price eﬀects
carry the expected negative sign, indicating that a higher industry output decreases
prices. The negative cross-price eﬀects show that adjacent generations represent
substitutable products and indicate that a negative externality enters firms’ pricing
relations in the multiproduct specification. The time trend is negative, which is
a plausible outcome, for consumers substitute away from the generation as time
passes.
The estimation of the pricing relation for the multiproduct (equation (8)) and the
single product firm specification (equation (9)) enables us to test our hypothesis.
The estimates are shown in Table 4. In both regressions, 293 observations have
been used. A Durbin-Watson statistic by Bhargava, Franzini, and Narendranathan
(1982) indicates that the residuals are positively correlated, which we correct for
by applying a first order moving average process.32 Both estimations have a very
good fit. The adjusted R-squares for the multiproduct and the single product firm
specification are 0.91. The Durbin Watson statistics of 1.70 and 1.74 indicate no
further serial correlation. Most of the parameter estimates are significant at the 1%
level.
The parameter estimates of LBD and LBD2 are highly significant for the multi-
product and the single product firm specification. In general, we find evidence that
a higher degree of past experience reduces marginal costs in both specifications.
Table 5 shows the calculated learning elasticities and learning rates for both model
specifications.33 The learning elasticity for the multiproduct (single product) firm
specification amounts to -0.47 (-1.03) which corresponds to a 28% (51%) learning
32Note that the pricing relation is estimated by 2-SLS because a GMM estimation does not
converge. The first observation for every firm is being dropped for the correction procedure.
33The learning rate is calculated by 1− 2α, where α represents the learning elasticity.
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rate. Hence, LBD eﬀects for multiproduct firms are lower than those for single prod-
uct firms. A doubling in firm’s accumulated output (at the sample mean) reduces
marginal costs in the multiproduct specification by 28% which is a very reasonable
number as it is similar to what has been claimed in the engineering literature. Irwin
and Klenow (1994) cite a report by the Oﬃce of Technology Assessment (1983) in
which the accepted best point of estimate of learning is 28%. In general, the LBD
rates reinforce that the model specifications support reliable results.
The parameter estimates for the ECS eﬀects measured by ECS and ECS2 are
shown to be significant under both model specifications (see Table 4). Positive ECS
elasticities indicate that decreasing returns to scale are evident (Table 5), which
are even stronger decreasing in the single product firm specification. The finding
of decreasing ECS eﬀects illustrates the importance of correcting for those, when
estimating LBD eﬀects. In contrast, when ECS are assumed to be constant, an
omitted variable bias would result in underestimated LBD eﬀects. This phenomenon
may also explain why the previous literature under single product firm specification
provides lower LBD eﬀects with around 20%-30%, whereas in our study they are
estimated to be 51%.
Turning to the estimates of the spillover eﬀects measured by Spill and Spill2
we do not find evident spillovers. The parameter estimates for the dynamic eﬀects,
measured by Fut and (Fut)2 in Table 4, are significantly diﬀerent from zero only for
the multiproduct firm specification. Table 5 indicates that the dynamic marginal
cost function has an overall negative slope for the multiproduct firm specification.
Hence, multiproduct firms follow an intertemporal output strategy in which they
increase output today in order to benefit from future cost reductions. They price
according to their dynamic marginal cost which lie below static marginal costs. The
single product specification does not support intertemporal production eﬀects (see
Table 4), indicating that the dynamic marginal cost function is rather flat. Summa-
rizing the facts, results in the dynamic marginal cost function for the multiproduct
firm specification lying above those for the single product firm specification.
The estimates for the conduct parameters CONDM,S for the multiproduct as
well as the single product firm specification are shown in Table 4. A comparison
of the conduct parameters supports the claim that a multiproduct firm specifica-
tion gives diﬀerent results with respect to market power than a single product firm
specification. The conduct parameter for the multiproduct firm specification is close
to zero, indicating that firms charge prices close to overall marginal costs and be-
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have as if in perfect competition. In contrast, the parameter estimate for the single
product firm model indicates that firms behave like Cournot players. This result
is consistent with the previous literature, confirming that the overall model spec-
ification gives reliable results. We therefore gain support that firms’ behavior is
estimated to be more competitive in a multiproduct than in a single product firm
specification. As econometricians only know about the observed quantities but not
about the unobserved incentive to reduce output - which is due to the internaliza-
tion of negative externalities on adjacent generations - the omitted externality when
specifying a single product firm model leads to an underestimate of the competitive
degree in the product market. A multiproduct firm specification controls for the
output reduction resulting from internalized externalities on adjacent generations
and, hence, results in a more competitive degree of product market competition.
Firm-specific eﬀects are shown to be significant, indicating that unobserved het-
erogeneities are an important fact for explaining firms’ marginal costs. The parame-
ter estimates for the factor prices are all positive (except wages) which is meaningful
since higher factor prices are supposed to raise firms marginal costs. User costs of
capital, as well as energy prices have a highly significant impact on marginal costs in
the multiproduct firm specification. In general, we get relatively similar parameter
estimates for the single product and multiproduct firm specification which confirms
the functional form chosen for the models and the reliability of the estimations.
Concerning our hypothesis we find strong support for the contention that the
learning estimates as well as market conduct are diﬀerent once we correct for multi-
production through product diﬀerentiation. More precisely, we find support for our
hypothesis, that market conduct is estimated to be more competitive, and learning
eﬀects are estimated smaller in a multiproduct firm specification.
Turning to the alteration of learning eﬀects over the life cycle, we see that the
parameter estimate for LBD2 is significantly positive, indicating that LBD eﬀects
are larger at the beginning of the life cycle, an outcome that supports previous as-
sumptions. In investigating firms’ dynamic eﬀects over time we provide evidence
that the dynamic marginal cost function is convex for the multiproduct firm specifi-
cation, as shown by the significantly positive sign of (Fut)2 in Table 4. This finding
indicates that firms follow an intertemporal output strategy and increase output
more at the beginning of the life cycle. The result coincides with higher LBD at
the beginning where firms take advantage of the cost reducing eﬀect by increasing
production. The significantly positive estimate of ECS2 indicates that decreasing
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ECS eﬀects become even stronger throughout the product life cycle.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to illustrate the importance of accounting for multi-
production through product diﬀerentiation when investigating the measurement of
learning eﬀects. One feature that our study highlights is the fact that correcting
for multiproduction eﬀects changes firms’ objective functions accounting for further
externalities between products. Once cross-price eﬀects are accounted for, diﬀerent
output incentives are attributed to the measurement of learning eﬀects.
We find strong support for our hypothesis that adjacent generations are sub-
stitutable goods, confirming the notion that negative externalities enter firms’ ob-
jective functions which are internalized under multiproduct firm specification. A
single product firm specification gives that firms behave like Cournot players in the
product market, whereas a multiproduct firm specification shows that firms behave
more ‘competitively’ in the product market, as if in perfect competition. Estimating
a tougher product market competition corresponds with lower price-cost margins,
having an impact on the nested marginal costs and, thus, on learning eﬀects. We find
that LBD eﬀects are lower in a multiproduct firm specification with around 28%,
whereas in a single product firm specification they amount to 51%. The multiprod-
uct firm specification illustrates the intertemporal eﬀect quite well, that firms follow
an intertemporal output strategy and invest in future cost reductions by increasing
output.
Putting the findings together, namely, that multiproduct firms behave as if in
perfect competition charging prices close to static marginal costs, and also that the
average learning rate is about 28%, it follows that the calculated dumping margin
of 20% for the 64K life cycle (see Dick, 1991) illustrates quite clearly the finding of
marginal shadow cost pricing. We can confirm the result that Japanese firms did not
engage in dumping with regard to the 64K DRAM generation, once learning eﬀects
are taken into account. However, as opposed to the single product firm specification,
we get diﬀerent results for the degree of product market competition and learning
eﬀects in a multiproduction setting. We can conclude that both aspects are very
sensitive with respect to multiproduction eﬀects through product diﬀerentiation.
Moreover, we provide evidence that learning and ECS eﬀects vary throughout the
product life cycle and become smaller over time. The finding of higher intertemporal
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output eﬀects at the beginning of the product life cycle coincides with higher LBD
eﬀects at the early stages showing that firms optimize their intertemporal production
plans.
This study demonstrates the importance having regard to multiproduction eﬀects
through product diﬀerentiation in future investigations on learning. However, the
fundamental statement of this study may also apply towards other areas where
multiproduction eﬀects play a crucial role and determine firms’ behavior in the
product market, like for example, mergers, joint ventures, licensing etc.
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Appendix: Figuresand Tables
Figure 1: Price sett ing with respect to shadow marginal costs
Figure 2: Units of shipments per generat ion over t ime (quarterly)
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Figure 3: Price decline per generat ion over t ime
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Firms Gener. 4K 16K 64K 256K 1Mb 4Mb 16Mb 64Mb
Adv. Micro Dev. 3 x x x . . . . .
Alliance 1 . . . . . x . .
Am. Microsyst. 1 x . . . . . . .
AT&T 2 . . . x x . . .
Eurotechnique 1 . x . . . . . .
Fairchild 3 x x x . . . . .
Fujitsu 8 x x x x x x x x
G-Link 2 . . . . x x . .
Hitachi 8 x x x x x x x x
Hyundai 6 . . x x x x x x
IBM 4 . . . . x x x x
Inmos 2 . . x x . . . .
Intel 5 x x x x x . . .
Intersil 2 x x . . . . . .
LG Semicon 5 . . . x x x x x
Matsushita 6 . x x x x x x .
Micron 5 . . x x x x x .
Mitsubishi 7 . x x x x x x x
Mosel Vitelic 5 . . x x x x x .
Mostek 4 x x x x . . . .
Motorola 8 x x x x x x x x
Nan Ya Techn. 1 . . . . . . x .
Ntl. Semic. 4 x x x x . . . .
NEC 8 x x x x x x x x
Nippon Steel 4 . . . x x x x .
OKI 5 . . x x x x x .
Ramtron Int. 1 . . . . . x . .
Samsung 6 . . x x x x x x
Sanyo 3 . . . x x x . .
SGS-Ates 2 x x . . . . . .
Sharp 4 . . x x x x . .
Siemens 7 . x x x x x x x
Signetics 2 x x . . . . . .
STC-ITT 3 x x x . . . . .
Texas Instr. 8 x x x x x x x x
Toshiba 7 . x x x x x x x
Vanguard 2 . . . . . x x .
Zilog 1 . x . . . . . .
Table 1: Multiproduct firms in the DRAM industry
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Variables Description Mean Min. Max.
Pk,t Average selling price of one chip 13.02 0.75 135.00
of generation k in period t.
qk−1,t Total number of chips of the k-1’th 18.98E06 0 78.54E06
generation being sold in period t.
qk,t Total number of chips of the k’th 38.72E06 3000 264.40E06
generation being sold in period t.
qk+1,t Total number of chips of the k+1’st 68.62E06 0 242.41E06
generation being sold in period t.
Pk,t Average selling price of k in period t. 5.55 0.75 100.00
LBDi,k,t LBD for firm i oﬀering 64.62E06 6000 324.38E06
generation k in period t.
ECSi,k,t Measure of ECS for firm i 5.05E06 5000 31.53E06
oﬀering generation k in period t.
Spilli,k,t spillover measure for firm i 23.21E06 62.80 12.67E08
oﬀering generation k in period t.
qi,k−1,t Firm i’s number of chips from the 1.70E06 0 12.35E06
k-1’st generation being sold in period t.
qi,k,t Firm i’s number of chips of the 5.05E06 5000 31.53E06
k’th generation being sold in period t.
qi,k+1,t Firm i’s number of chips of the k+1’st 2.91E06 0 39.00E06
generation being sold in period t.
WGDPELt GDP in electronics in period t. 78.61E18 64.05E09 2.18E20
NOFk−1,t Number of firms competing in the 4.47 0 17
market of generation k − 1 at period t.
NOFk,t Number of firms competing in the 14.03 3 20
market of generation k at period t.
NOFk+1,t Number of firms competing in the 15.75 0 19
market of generation k + 1 at period t.
AMSk,t Average market share of firms in 0.10 0.01E-2 1
generation k at period t.
Table 2: Variable definitions and summary statistics for demand and supply
relations
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16K Generation (k-1) 64K Generation (k) 256K Generation (k+1)
Variables Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
Constant 100.33** 11.31 134.09** 23.71 208.62** 30.29
qk−2 -2.92E-6** 5.64E-7 - - - -
qk−1 -2.17E-7** 9.17E-8 -6.22E-7** 2.98E-7 - -
qk 2.57E-8 4.01E-8 -2.67E-7** 8.01E-8 -5.00E-7** 1.60E-7
qk+1 - - -1.47E-7** 6.21E-8 -2.74E-7** 3.01E-8
qk+2 - - - - -1.22E-7* 6.37E-8
q•·WGDP -6.99E-21 5.45E-21 -4.70E-21 6.68E-21 6.77E-22 2.07E-21
t -8.64** 1.36 -6.43** 1.07 -8.91** 1.13
Obs.=36, adj. R2=0.73 Obs.=68, adj. R2=0.70 Obs.=57, adj. R2=0.74
**significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level, k-2=4K Generation, k-1=16K
Generation, k=64K Generation, k+1=256K Generation, k+2=1Mb Generation.
Table 3: GMM estimates for the inverse demand equations
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Multiproduct Firm Specification Single-Product Firm Specification
Variables Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
LBD -10.07** 3.13 -8.97** 2.75
LBD2 0.29** 0.11 0.25** 0.10
ECS -7.52** 2.36 -12.68** 2.85
ECS2 0.31** 0.08 0.54** 0.11
Spill -20.42** 1.20 -20.70** 1.17
Spill2 0.61** 0.05 0.63** 0.05
MAT 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.11
UCC 0.78** 0.25 0.79** 0.25
LAB -0.05 0.15 0.002 0.15
E 0.12* 0.07 0.09 0.08
CONDM,S 0.25* 0.16 1.09** 0.39
Fut -19.40* 10.64 -14.69 10.66
Fut2 17.06* 9.07 13.20 9.06
α0,1 300.54** 16.91 323.10** 19.55
α0,2 290.64** 16.51 312.67** 19.07
α0,3 300.89** 15.89 324.58** 18.95
α0,4 298.26** 15.81 322.13** 18.92
α0,5 303.08** 17.81 324.52** 20.10
α0,6 299.69** 16.52 322.67** 19.30
α0,7 297.39** 16.28 320.78** 19.18
α0,8 298.27** 16.55 321.46** 19.37
α0,9 299.70** 16.30 323.37** 19.27
α0,10 298.39** 15.95 321.96** 18.95
α0,11 303.28** 16.65 326.22** 19.40
α0,12 304.28** 16.34 324.10** 18.46
α0,13 298.40** 15.97 322.06** 18.97
α0,14 295.69** 16.28 318.86** 19.15
α0,15 302.14** 17.42 324.95** 20.06
α0,16 301.79** 16.43 325.06** 19.28
α0,17 303.16** 17.05 326.23** 19.78
α0,18 300.59** 15.51 324.41** 18.64
α0,19 299.59** 16.07 322.92** 19.00
MA(1) -0.53** 0.06 -0.52** 0.06
Obs.=293, adj. R2=0.91, DW=1.70 Obs.=293, adj. R2=0.91, DW=1.74
**significant at the 1% level, *significant at the 10% level, α = α for
multiproduct firm specification and α = eα for single product firm specification.
Table 4: Pricing relation
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Multiproduct Comp. Single-Product Comp.
Eﬀects Elast. Rate Elast. Rate
LBD -0.47 28% -1.03 51%
Spill 0.19 Á 0.49 Á
ECS 1.32 Á 2.47 Á
Fut -16.46 Á -12.42 Á
Table 5: LBD, spillover, ECS, and intertemporal eﬀects
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